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Empirical studies conclude that real exchange rate dynamics are very volatile, persistent,
and hump-shaped against shocks as shown in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Cheung and
Lai (2000), Faust and Rogers (2003), and Steinsson (2007). Thus far in international ￿-
nance, there has been intense debate as to whether theoretical dynamic general equilibrium
models can reproduce such realistic exchange rate dynamics. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2002), focusing on the ￿rst two features, insist that New Open Economy Macroeconomics
(NOEM) models may account for the volatility but not for the persistence to a monetary
policy shock. In response to this critique, several studies have attempted to solve these three
puzzles by introducing such features as strategic complementarity, nonoptimizing monetary
policy, and optimal monetary policy into otherwise standard NOEM models as in Bergin
and Feenstra (2000) and Benigno (2004a, b). These newly introduced mechanisms mitigate
the persistence puzzle of the real exchange rate dynamics to some extent, but have not yet
solved it completely. Actual persistence of real exchange rates is still higher than that
simulated in those models. Furthermore, the mechanisms do not explain the signi￿cant
hump-shaped responses of real exchange rates found in data. Steinsson (2007) stresses the
importance of generating hump-shaped responses based on his autoregressive estimation
of real exchange rates and shows that realistic levels of volatility, persistence, and hump-
shaped responses of real exchange rates can be generated with the NOEM models when
the cost-push shock is added to the economy, where the home bias is very strong.1
Analyses of the role of ￿nancial market imperfection for the real exchange rate dynam-
ics, however, are very limited, even though Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2007) emphasize the role of a ￿nancial market imper-
fection to explain the business cycle tendencies found in data. In this paper, therefore we
shed light on a sticky loan rate adjustment as a ￿nancial market imperfection for the real
exchange rate dynamics. The loan rate stickiness is reported in Slovin and Sushka (1983)
and Berger and Udell (1992) for the United States (US), Sorensen and Werner (2006) and
1The importance of reproducing the hump-shaped responses are emphasized in, for example, Chrsitiano
and Vigfusson (2003) and Vigfusson (2007).
2Gambacorta (2008) for the euro area, and Bank of Japan (2007, 2009) for Japan.
We construct a NOEM model with an explicit role of banks in which we incorporate
sticky loan interest rate contracts as in Teranishi (2007), which assumes it in the closed
economy.2 In our model, following Gadanecz (2004), McGuire and Tarashev (2006), and
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007, 2008), banks make loans to both domestic and foreign ￿rms.
The loan rate stickiness stems from imperfect (monopolistic) competition among banks for
￿rms as shown in Sander and Kleimeier (2004), Gropp, Sorensen, and Lichtenberger (2007),
and Gropp and Kashyap (2009).
We ￿rst estimate the loan interest rate stickiness for the United Kingdom (UK), the
euro area, and Japan. Results show that banks, on average, take three quarters to adjust
loan rates in these countries. Then we show that our model with such an estimated
loan interest rate stickiness can replicate persistent, volatile, and realistic hump-shaped
responses of real exchange rates even with both supply-side disturbances through cost-
push and loan rate shocks and demand-side disturbances through a monetary policy shock.
In particular, the fact that we can reproduce such a realistic response via a monetary
policy shock merits attention. Previous studies, such as Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2002) and Steinsson (2007), demonstrate that it is impossible to produce hump-shaped
real exchange rate dynamics with such a shock. These results of hump-shaped real exchange
rate dynamics are obtained in our model with sticky prices solely due to staggered loan
contracts. Interestingly, by further incorporating the staggered price setting, which has
been considered the important element for realistic real exchange rate dynamics in former
studies, we cannot replicate the hump-shaped real exchange rate dynamics to the monetary
policy shock.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we show the outline of the
model. In Section 3, after a brief survey of previous studies related to sticky loan rates, we
estimate the degree of loan rate stickiness for the euro area, the UK, and Japan. Section
2Graham and Wright (2007) also incorporate sticky loan interest rates into a closed-economy general
equilibrium model. Contrary to Teranishi (2007), stickiness in interest rates is imposed for consumers rather
than ￿rms in Graham and Wright (2007). Thus, the loan interest rate in the IS curve is sticky in Graham
and Wright (2007), but the loan interest rate in the Phillips curve is sticky in our model.
34 shows that realistic responses of real exchange rates are produced in our model with
staggered loan contracts. In Section 5, we discuss the case with the staggered price setting.
Finally, Section 6 summarizes the ￿ndings in this paper.
2 Model
The model consists of two symmetric countries. There are four types of agents in each
country, consumers, ￿rms, private banks, and the central bank as shown in Figure 1. In
this section, we only show the outline of the model. A detailed derivation of the model is
shown in Appendix A.
[Figure 1: Outline of the Model]
2.1 Consumers
A representative consumer chooses the amount of aggregate consumption, bank deposits,
and investment in a set of risky assets given a deposit interest rate set by the central bank;
consumes di⁄erentiated goods on both home- and foreign-produced consumer goods; pro-
vides di⁄erentiated labor services to both domestically ￿nancially supported (DFS) and
internationally ￿nancially supported (IFS) projects, as well as o⁄ers wages to those di⁄er-
entiated types of labor with monopolistic power over labor supply; and owns banks and
￿rms and receives dividends in each period.3 In particular, the existence of the di⁄erenti-
ated labor services is crucial for monopolistic competition in loan rate settings.4 Thanks
to this di⁄erentiated labor supply, the demand for loans is di⁄erentiated without assuming
any restrictions on aggregate loans or loan interest rates.
3Throughout our analyses, homotheticity of preferences is maintained.
4We assume that a representative household supplies di⁄erentiated labor to each di⁄erentiated project.
On the other hand, each household supplies di⁄erentiated labor to one project (￿rm) in Erceg, Henderson,
and Levin (2000), but risks from labor supply di⁄erentiation can be completely insured. Both speci￿cations
produce identical results.




















where Et is the expectation operator conditional on the state of nature at date t. U(￿) is
an increasing and concave function in the consumption index Ct, and V (￿) is an increasing
and convex function in labor supply lt(￿). The budget constraint of the consumer is given
by







wt(￿ h)lt(￿ h)d￿ h + ￿B
t + ￿F
t ;
where Pt is a price index, Bt is a set of risky assets, Dt is the amount of deposits at private
banks, it is the nominal deposit interest rate set by a central bank from t￿1 to t, wt(h) is
the nominal wage for labor supplied from the DFS group lt(h), wt(￿ h) is the nominal wage




t￿1(h)dh is the nominal dividend





t￿1(f)df is the nominal dividend from the ownership of the ￿rms in the domestic
country, and Xt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor. The labor type h and the ￿rm￿ s project
type h match each other. Here, because we assume a complete ￿nancial market between
the two countries, the consumer in each country can internationally buy and sell the state
contingent securities to insure against country speci￿c shocks. The consumption index that
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;
where ￿H (0 ￿ ￿H ￿ 1) is a preference parameter that expresses the home bias. Here, CH;t
and CF;t are consumption subindices of the continuum of di⁄erentiated goods produced by




















5where ct (f) is the demand for a good produced by ￿rm f in the home country and ct (f￿)
is the demand for a good produced by a ￿rm f￿ in the foreign country, where the asterisk
denotes foreign variables. The consumer decides goods demand according to goods prices
through a cost minimization under these indices. It is assumed that there is no trade
friction and consumers in both countries have the same preferences over the di⁄erentiated
goods.
The foreign consumers also solve a similar optimization problem.
2.2 Firms
There exists a continuum of ￿rms in each country. Each ￿rm decides the amount of
di⁄erentiated labor to be employed from both the DFS and IFS groups through the cost
minimization for the production cost. Part of the costs of labor must be ￿nanced by
external loans from banks. For example, in country H, to ￿nance the costs of hiring
workers from the DFS group for the DFS project, the ￿rm must borrow from local banks
in the home country. However, to ￿nance the costs of hiring workers from the IFS group,
the ￿rm must borrow from international banks in the foreign country. This re￿ ects the
fact that ￿nancial markets are globally integrated, namely, a signi￿cant increase has taken
place in international borrowing and lending as shown in Gadanecz (2004), McGuire and
Tarashev (2006), and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007, 2008). We also know by looking into
actual project ￿nance that ￿rms borrow funds with many di⁄erent loan interest rates at the
same time, depending on the nature of the projects. Firms tend to face di⁄erent loan rates
depending on when, why, for what, how long, or how much they require external funds. We
interpret that these project di⁄erences are characterized by types of labor. For this point,
we can assume a situation where each project factory in one region is forced to borrow from
a neighbor bank by information or geographical segmentation in the bank evaluating the
project, as in Mandelman (2006).5 Labor is immobile between the two countries. Here, we
5Kobayashi (2008) shows that a one-to-one relation between a ￿rm and a bank due to monopoly induces
the same loan rate curve as in our model. In this case, we assume that an intermediate good producer uses
one type of loan and labor to produce an intermediate goods and a ￿nal goods producer uses all types of
intermediate goods to produce a ￿nal good.
6assume that ￿rms must use all types of labors and therefore borrow from both local and
international banks in the same proportion.
At the same time, each ￿rm sets goods prices under monopolistically competitive mar-
kets under pricing-to-market. In the benchmark model explained here, we do not incorpo-
rate the staggered price setting, but prices are sticky due to staggered loan contracts that
make marginal costs sticky, similar to the case with the sticky wages. We also examine the
case with sticky prices later.
Let us ￿rst explain the determination of the marginal costs. Firms in both home
and foreign countries optimally hire di⁄erentiated labor as price takers. This optimal
labor allocation is carried out through two-step cost minimization problems. For example,
domestic ￿rm f hires all types of labor from both the DFS and IFS groups. When hiring
from the DFS group, the ￿ portion of the labor cost associated with labor type h is ￿nanced
by borrowing from the local bank h. Then, the ￿rst-step cost minimization problem on the
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where rt(h) is the loan interest rate applied to employ a particular labor type h applied
to di⁄erentiated labor supply. There lt(h;f) denotes the type of labor h employed by ￿rm
f. The local bank h has some monopoly power over setting loan interest rates. Thus, we
assume monopolistic competition on the loan contracts between banks and ￿rms. Based
on the optimality conditions obtained from the above problem, the ￿rms optimally choose
the allocation of di⁄erentiated workers between the two groups. Because ￿rms have some
preference n to hire workers from the DFS group and (1 ￿ n) to hire workers from the IFS
group, the second-step cost minimization problem describing the allocation of di⁄erentiated
labor between these two groups is given by
min
Lt;Lt













and ￿ ￿t and ￿ Lt (f) are those for the IFS group, subject to the aggregate labor index:
~ Lt (f) ￿
[Lt (f)]
n ￿￿ Lt (f)
￿1￿n
nn (1 ￿ n)
1￿n :
Then, we have pro￿t maximization in terms of price setting. Each domestic ￿rm f sets
its price pt (f) and p￿
t (f) to maximize the pro￿t, which is given by
pt (f)ct (f) + Stp￿
t (f)c￿
t (f) ￿ ~ ￿t~ Lt (f);
where we de￿ne
~ ￿t ￿ ￿n
t ￿ ￿1￿n
t ;
St is the nominal exchange rate, and ct (f) and c￿
t (f) are demand for the goods in domestic
and foreign countries, respectively, that can be derived from the consumption bundles
de￿ned above. Although the ￿rm sets pt (f) and p￿
t (f) separately under the pricing-to-
market assumption, without infrequent price changes we have
pt (f) = Stp￿
t (f):
We have a similar maximization problem for the foreign ￿rm f￿.
2.3 Private Banks
There exists a continuum of private banks. There are two types of banks in each country:
local banks and international banks. Each private bank plays two roles. A bank collects the
deposits from consumers in its country. It also sets di⁄erentiated nominal loan interest rates
according to their individual loan demand curves under the monopolistically competitive
loan market. This heterogeneity re￿ ects the empirical evidence for dispersed loan rates
through the imperfect competition between ￿rms and private banks on loan contracts
reported by Sander and Kleimeier (2004), Gropp, Sorensen, and Lichtenberger (2007), and
Gropp and Kashyap (2009). Moreover, Sander and Kleimeier (2004) and Gropp, Sorensen,
and Lichtenberger (2007) show that this imperfection induces staggered loan rate contracts,
which gives a justi￿cation for staggered loan rates found in the empirical studies.
8A local bank lends only to ￿rms when they hire labor from the DFS group. However,
an international bank only provides a loan to ￿rms when they hire labor from the IFS
group. We here describe the optimization problem of an international bank in the home
country. The international bank takes on the exchange rate risk inherent in its loans.
Each international bank can reset loan interest rates with probability (1 ￿ ￿ ’￿) following
the Calvo (1983)￿ Yun (1996) framework. Under the segmented environment, private banks
can set di⁄erent loan interest rates depending on the types of labor. As a consequence, the
private bank holds some monopoly power over the loan interest rate to ￿rms. Therefore,
the international bank ￿ h￿ chooses the loan interest rate rt
￿￿ h￿￿
to maximize the present
















is the amounts of loans borrowed by ￿rm f￿ for the labor types ￿ h￿. The
demand for loans is derived from the cost minimization problem by ￿rms.
Local banks in the home country and international and local banks in the foreign
country face a similar pro￿t maximization problem.
2.4 Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
By log-linearly approximating the equilibrium conditions obtained from above problems






A , where A is the steady state of At: They are as follows.
Aggregate consumption in each country is given by
^ Ct = Et ^ Ct+1 ￿ ￿ (^ {t ￿ Et￿t+1); (1)
and
^ C￿
t = Et ^ C￿







t) denotes home (foreign) consumer price index (CPI) in￿ ation, ut is a demand shock
in the home country, and ￿ and ￿￿ are positive parameters regarding the elasticity of
consumption with respect to the real interest rate.
9The price setting equations in the home and foreign countries are given by
0 = ￿H
￿
￿1 ^ RH;t + ￿2 ^ R￿
H;t
￿
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￿1 ^ RH;t + ￿2 ^ R￿
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t + (1 ￿ ￿F) ^ CW￿
t
i
￿ 2￿F (1 ￿ ￿F) ^ et; (4)
where we de￿ne
^ CW
t ￿ ￿H ^ Ct + (1 ￿ ￿H) ^ C￿
t ; (5)
^ CW￿
t ￿ ￿F ^ Ct + (1 ￿ ￿F) ^ C￿
t : (6)
Equations (3) to (4) simply show that marginal costs are always constant. An international
perfect risk-sharing condition implies
￿￿
t ￿ ￿t + 4^ St = 4^ et; (7)
and the de￿nitions of nominal and real exchange rates imply
￿^ et = ^ Ct ￿ ^ C￿
t + xt: (8)
Here ^ RH;t ( ^ RF;t) denotes the loan rate o⁄ered by a home local (foreign international) bank
to a home ￿rm, ^ R￿
H;t ( ^ R￿
F;t) denotes the loan rate o⁄ered by a home international (foreign
local) bank to a foreign ￿rm, ￿^ St denotes the growth rate of nominal exchange rates, ^ et
denotes the real exchange rate, mt denotes the cost-push shock in the home country, and
xt denotes the UIP shock. For the reason and importance of the uncovered interest rate
parity (UIP) shock in open economy models, we can see Lubik and Schorfheide (2005). ￿1,
￿2, ￿￿
1, and ￿￿
2 are positive parameters regarding the cost channel of loan contract, and
￿F = 1￿￿H.6 As shown in Steinsson (2007), the cost-push shock plays an important role
in economic dynamics.
6When there is no loan contract with ￿ exible price, the price setting equations given by equations (3)










+ 2￿H (1 ￿ ￿H) ^ et + mt;
10The (new Keynesian) loan supply curves in both countries are
^ RF;t = ￿ ￿
￿
1Et ^ RF;t+1 + ￿ ￿
￿




^ {t ￿ Et4^ St+1
￿
; (9)
^ RH;t = ￿1Et ^ RH;t+1 + ￿2 ^ RH;t￿1 + ￿3^ {t + zt; (10)
^ R￿
H;t = ￿ ￿1Et ^ R￿
H;t+1 + ￿ ￿2 ^ R￿
H;t￿1 + ￿ ￿3
￿













Here zt is the loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local banks for home ￿rms.7
￿ ￿
￿
j, ￿j, ￿ ￿j, and ￿￿
j for j = 1, 2, and 3 are positive parameters regarding loan rate curves.
In Cœrdia and Woodford (2009) and Gerali et al. (2009), the loan rate shock comes from a
default risk and a risk premium for the borrower.8 It is worth mentioning that one reason
why these loan rate curves include lags because the loan rate is like a price level in the new
Keynesian Phillips curve. If the new Keynesian Phillips curve is expressed in terms of the
price level rather than in￿ ation, it must contain the lagged price level.
To close the model, the central banks in both countries set the deposit (policy) interest
rates following the Taylor (1993)-type rules as





t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿￿
i)￿￿
1￿￿




Here vt is a monetary policy shock in the home country. ￿1, ￿2, ￿￿
1, ￿￿
2, ￿i, and ￿￿
i are
positive policy parameters. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) show the reason and










￿ 2￿F (1 ￿ ￿F) ^ et:
Note that the policy rate cannot a⁄ect consumption since home and foreign consumption is determined by
these two equations and equation (8) as implied by Woodford (2003).
7When we assume an international loan rate shock for the loan rate set by foreign international banks
for home ￿rms in equation (9), similar results are obtained in simulations.
8Recent studies such as Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006) insist that international
risk premium shocks can induce large business cycles. Moreover, Marston (1995) and Uribe and Yue (2006)
state that interest rate spreads are quite persistent.
11We have 14 equations, namely, equations (1) to (14), for 14 endogenous variables: ^ C,
^ C￿, ￿, ￿￿, ^ CW, ^ CW￿
, ^ e, ￿^ S, ^ RF, ^ RH, ^ R￿
H, ^ R￿
F, ^ {, and ^ {￿.
3 Empirical Evidence for a Sticky Loan Rate
Stickiness in loan rates has been reported regardless of newly contracted or outstanding
and short- or long-term contracts. For the US, using micro-data, Slovin and Sushka (1983)
show that it takes two or more quarters for private banks to adjust loan rates even for
newly contracted loans against changes in the market rate. This ￿nding is consistent with
the results in Berger and Udell (1992). For the euro area countries, Sorensen and Werner
(2006) estimate the incompleteness in the pass-through from policy rates to loan rates via
an error correction model using macro-data. They ￿nd the lags ranging between one and
three quarters even for newly contracted long-term loans. Gambacorta (2008) conducts
a similar analysis for Italy and shows the existence of sticky adjustment in loan rates for
about two quarters for newly contracted short-term lending. For Japan, Bank of Japan
(2007, Figure 50) reports that the major city banks need more than three quarters and
local banks need more than ￿ve quarters to adjust their loan rates to a change in the policy
rate. Similarly, Bank of Japan (2009, Figure 3￿ 12) concludes that loan rates demonstrate
considerable stickiness. Several reasons are also reported for the existence of the sticky
loan interest rates. Sorensen and Werner (2006), Sander and Kleimeier (2004), and Gropp,
Sorensen, and Lichtenberger (2007) claim that the lower degree of competition can induce
a higher degree of loan rate stickiness. Less competition gives banks the ability to bene￿t
through sluggish adjustment of the lending rate. On the other hand, Berger and Udell
(1992) emphasize relationship banking, insisting that long-run (repeated) business relations
between banks and ￿rms can result in loan rate stickiness. The banks set lower interest
rates to insure that risk-averse borrowers in a long-run relationship avoid bankruptcy when
interest rates are high. In this paper, we take the former view when modeling the loan rate
stickiness.
To understand the real exchange rate dynamics in our model, we need to obtain the
parameters on the loan rate stickiness. We estimate the Calvo parameter implicit in the new
12Keynesian loan rate curve in equation (10) by nonlinear maximum likelihood estimation for
the UK, the euro area, and Japan due to the data availability. When estimating the Calvo
parameters, we assume that the same loan rate stickiness should apply for both domestic
and international lending. We use o¢ cial policy rates provided by central banks. For the
UK, we use the o¢ cial bank rate and weighted average overdraft interest rate for non-
￿nancial corporations for the period from January 1999 to March 2009; for the euro area,
we use the main re￿nancing operations ￿xed rate and average outstanding loan interest rate
from banks for non-￿nancial corporations from the monetary ￿nancial institution (MFI)
interest rate statistics for the period from January 2003 to March 2009; for Japan, we use
the overnight uncollateralized call rate and average stock loan interest rate for the period
from January 1984 to December 1995.9 All data are monthly average and are de-trended
by the HP ￿lter with the smoothing parameter 14,400, which is usually used for monthly
data. For a forward (expected) variable, we use the one-period-ahead forecast obtained
from an estimated AR(2) model.
Table 1 reports the values of the Calvo parameters on a quarterly basis. We can see
that similar values are obtained for all three areas. On average, since the Calvo parameter
on a quarterly basis is very close to 0.66, the loan interest rates are adjusted by about three
quarters in each country. These ￿ndings are consistent with the former empirical studies.
In the next section, we examine the responses of the real exchange rate to structural shocks
under the estimated parameters of sticky loan rates in this section.
4 Simulation




i are from Steinsson (2007), ￿ and ￿￿ are from Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), and ’,
’￿, ￿ ’, and ￿ ’￿ are the estimated average value of loan rate stickiness across the countries
in Table 1. We assume that the ratio of the dependency on external ￿nance ￿ is unity and
preferences regarding labor supply are the same between the DFS and IFS groups.
9For the UK and the euro area, we use the whole sample available, but for Japan we only use the data
until the end of 1995 to avoid a policy period of virtually zero interest rates.
13We examine four types of positive 1 percent shocks. They are cost-push shock, loan
rates shock, UIP shock, and monetary policy shock. Following Steinsson (2007), we set
that each shock follows AR(1) process with a parameter of 0.9.
Table 3 shows the detailed simulation outcomes of the real exchange rate dynamics
for the home shocks. We report ￿ve statistics de￿ning the real exchange rate dynamics:
(1) UL (up-life); (2) UL/HL (up-life over half-life); (3) QL￿ HL (quarter-life minus half-
life); (4) AR(1) persistence; and (5) relative standard deviation of real exchange rates to
consumption.10 UL denotes the duration until the impulse response falls below the top
(maximum) point, while HL shows the duration until the impulse response falls below
half of the top point. QL denotes the duration until the impulse response falls below a
quarter of the top point. These are the measures for how the impulse response functions
are hump-shaped. For example, if the impulse responses are monotonically decreasing, UL
and UL/HL should be zero. If the impulse responses demonstrate persistent hump-shaped
dynamics, UL/HL and QL￿ HL become larger. For comparison, we also examine the case
with ￿ exible loan contracts (’ = ’￿ = ￿ ’ = ￿ ’￿ = 0).
The results are shown in Table 3.11 The ￿rst row in the table reports the average
of key empirical features of real exchange rates for the UK, the euro area, and Japan
shown in Steinsson (2007). The second to ￿fth rows illustrate outcomes from the model
simulation when loan rates are ￿ exible. These results demonstrate that the model can
replicate neither hump-shaped dynamics of the real exchange rate nor AR(1) persistence
when both the loan rate and price are ￿ exible. On the other hand, the sixth to ninth rows
show outcomes when banks cannot change loan interest rates every period. We can see
that the hump-shaped dynamics of the real exchange rates can materialize for loan rate
and monetary policy shocks. In particular, it is worth mentioning that we can reproduce
hump-shaped and persistent responses to monetary policy shock, given the fact that it has
been considered very di¢ cult (see, for example, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) and
Steinsson (2007)). Other statistics, namely, AR(1) persistence and the relative standard
10As explained in Steinsson (2007), our model cannot replicate the low correlation of consumption between
home and foreign countries, since we still maintain a complete ￿nancial market for consumers.
11We show impulse responses for loan rate shocks in Appendix B.
14deviation of real exchange rates compared to that of consumption, are also in line with the
empirical values with these two shocks.
The reason for the hump-shaped dynamics re￿ ects the fact that the real exchange rate
dynamics depend crucially on the marginal costs. To see this, we transform equations (3)
and (4) as
0 = (￿H ￿ ￿F)
￿
￿1 ^ RH;t + ￿2 ^ R￿
H;t
￿








+^ et + mt ￿ ￿￿1 (￿H ￿ ￿F)
2 xt;
where we use equation (8) and ￿ = ￿￿ from the assumption of symmetry. This equation
simply implies that the real exchange rate dynamics depend on the loan rate dynam-
ics. When loan rates are sticky, the loan rate dynamics are hump-shaped thanks to the
lags of loan rates in equations (9)￿ (12) to loan rate shocks. This directly results in the
hump-shaped real exchange rate dynamics. The monetary policy shock also produces such
dynamics since the policy rate works as a shock in the loan rate curves. Moreover, the
lag in the monetary policy rule further enhances the hump-shapedness of the loan rate
dynamics.12 Note that the parameters on the ￿rst and the second terms on the right-hand
side of equation (15) imply the role of the home bias. When there is no home bias, namely,
￿H = ￿F, hump-shaped responses of real exchange rates cannot be created.
We observe that the hump-shaped responses do not appear for the cost-push shock.
This will also become clear from equation (15). The cost-push shock directly a⁄ects the
real exchange rate and does not work through the loan rate adjustments. For the UIP
shock, loan rates applied to the home country move exactly in a manner opposite to those
of the foreign country. Therefore, the UIP shock can be considered as the same scale but
the di⁄erent sign of monetary policy shocks to home and foreign countries, respectively.
As a result, we have
0 = (￿H ￿ ￿F)
￿
￿1 ^ RH;t + ￿2 ^ R￿
H;t
￿









0 = ^ et ￿ ￿￿1 (￿H ￿ ￿F)
2 xt:
12In detail, ^ RH;t and ^ R
￿
H;t with ^ {t re￿ ecting the UIP condition, are the key to materializing the hump-
shaped dynamics of real exchange rates. Here, UIP means Et4^ St+1 = it ￿ i
￿
t.
15Thus, the real exchange rate dynamics are directly determined by the UIP shock following
the AR(1) process.
5 A Case with Infrequent Price Setting
How can the results obtained in the previous section be altered by the introduction of
the staggered price setting in addition to the staggered loan contracts examined before?
Following the Calvo (1983)￿ Yun (1996) framework, ￿rms can reset a goods price with
some positive probability every period. A detailed derivation is in Appendix A. Note that
the model without the staggered price setting can produce in￿ ation persistence thanks to
persistent marginal cost. Thus, the model with staggered price setting holds the dual sticky
mechanism for the price dynamics.
Two price setting equations given by equations (3) and (4) are now transformed into
the augmented new Keynesian Phillips curves:
￿t = ￿H￿
￿
￿1 ^ RH;t + ￿2 ^ R￿
H;t
￿










t + (1 ￿ ￿H) ^ CW￿
t
i
+ &^ et + ￿Et￿t+1 + mt;
and
￿￿
t = (1 ￿ ￿H)￿
￿

















t^ et + ￿Et￿￿
t+1:
The parameters ￿, ￿ ￿, &, ￿￿, ￿ ￿￿, and &￿ are given in Table 2. We set that ￿rms can change
the price once a year on average. When there is no loan contract, these augmented new
Keynesian Phillips curves are reduced to standard international new Keynesian Phillips
curves as in Steinsson (2007).
Table 4 shows the simulation outcomes from the model with both sticky price and
loan.13 The second to the ￿fth rows illustrate outcomes from the model when loan rates
are ￿ exible. On the other hand, the sixth to ninth rows show outcomes when both ￿rms
and banks cannot change goods prices and loan interest rates every period, respectively.
13We show impulse responses for loan rate shocks in Appendix B.
16We can see that the real exchange rate dynamics are hump-shaped only with cost-push and
loan rates shocks irrespective of whether the loan rates are sticky or not. The reason for this
is exactly that given by Steinsson (2007). By setting the home bias parameter very high,
the home cost-push shock has only negligible e⁄ects on foreign variables. Under such cir-
cumstances, the hump-shaped responses of real exchange rates come from the responses in
home consumption as implied by equation (8). Therefore, eventually, it depends on the dy-
namics of real interest rates in the home country since the consumption can be represented
as the discounted sum of future real interest rates according to the Euler conditions given
by equation (1). Here, after a cost-push shock hits the economy, in￿ ation and consumption
can move in opposite directions while they co-move to the demand and monetary policy
shocks. As a result, real interest rates a⁄ected naturally by short-term nominal interest
rates set through the Taylor (1993)-type rule show non-monotonic responses.14 Therefore,
we can reproduce the hump-shaped responses in real interest rates and therefore in real
exchange rates to cost-push shocks. A loan rate shock itself is not a cost-push shock, but
is considered to be a more microfounded cost-push shock. Thus, a direct shock to loan
interest rates works as if it were a cost-push shock and therefore results in hump-shaped
responses in the real exchange rate.
At the same time, due to this very reason, a model with the infrequent price change
cannot produce the hump-shaped real exchange rate dynamics for monetary policy shock.
The e⁄ects of the monetary policy shock through real interest rates completely dominate
those observed under the ￿ exible price setting. By the same reason in the previous section,
the real exchange rate dynamics are solely determined by the UIP shock that follows the
AR(1) process.
6 Concluding Remarks
Empirical papers have shown the nontrivial roles of ￿nancial market imperfections, which
can be represented as a staggered loan contract. We introduce this into an otherwise
standard NOEM model in a tractable manner. Simulation results with such staggered loan
14This logic is similar to Benigno (2004a).
17contracts can generate persistent, volatile, and hump-shaped responses in real exchange
rates for both supply and demand shocks, such as cost-push, loan rate, and monetary
policy shocks. In particular, the fact that we can reproduce such a realistic response
via a monetary policy shock merits attention, because reproduction has been considered
very di¢ cult by previous studies. According to the results in this paper, ￿nancial market
imperfections are a very important element in understanding the realistic real exchange
rate dynamics.
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22Table 1: Estimation result (quarter basis)
Country Mean ￿ ￿ interval
UK 0.59 [0.45, 0.74]
Euro area 0.57 [0.55, 0.58]
Japan 0.57 [0.56, 0.59]
Average 0.58 -
Note: We estimate the Calvo parameter implicit in equation (10) using nonlinear maximum likeli-
hood estimation. For the UK, we use the o¢ cial bank rate and weighted average overdraft interest
rate for non-￿nancial corporations for the period from January 1999 to March 2009. For the euro
area, we use the main re￿nancing operations ￿xed rate and average outstanding loan interest rate
from banks for non-￿nancial corporations from the MFI interest rate statistics for the period from
January 2003 to March 2009. For Japan, we use the overnight uncollateralized call rate and aver-
age stock loan interest rate for the period from January 1984 to December 1995. All data are the
monthly average and are de-trended by the HP ￿lter with the conventional parameter 14,400, which
is usually used for monthly data. For a forward (expected) variable, we use the one-period-ahead
forecast obtained from an estimated AR(2) model.
23Table 2: Parameter values
Parameters Values Explanation
￿ 0.99 Discount factor
￿;￿￿ 0.2 Elasticity of output with respect to real interest rate
￿1;￿￿
1 1 Marginal product of labor
￿1;￿￿
1 0 Elasticity of marginal disutility for labor
￿2;￿￿
2 0 Elasticity of marginal product of labor
￿;￿￿ 0.75 Probability of price change
’;’￿;’;’￿ 0.57 Probability of loan interest rate change
￿ 7.66 Substitutability of di⁄erentiated consumption goods
￿;￿￿ 7.66 Substitutability of di⁄erentiated laborers
￿;￿￿;￿;￿￿ 1 Ratio of external ￿nance to total ￿nance
n 0.5 Preference for labors in the DFS group
￿H 0.94 Preference for goods produced in the home country
￿1;￿￿
1 2 Coe¢ cient on in￿ ation rate in the Taylor rule
￿2;￿￿
2 0.5 Coe¢ cient on the output gap in the Taylor rule
￿i;￿￿
i 0.85 Lag parameter in the Taylor rule
Note: In particular, we de￿ne ￿1 ￿ n
￿(1+RH)





, where RH and R￿
H



















1+RF , where i is the steady state
value of the policy rate as ￿ = (1 + i)
￿1. We have (1 + ￿ ￿￿RF)￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ f(1 + RF) ￿ (1 + i)g = 0
in the steady state. We have similar de￿nitions for ￿j, ￿ ￿j, and ￿￿
j for j = 1, 2, and 3. We have
￿ ￿
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿(1+￿2￿) , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿1￿￿1
1 + ￿2 + ￿￿1￿
, and & ￿ 2￿￿H (1 ￿ ￿H). For ￿￿, ￿ ￿￿, and &￿, we
have similar de￿nitions. Other details for parameters are shown in Appendix A.
24Table 3: Properties of real exchange rate under basic model
Setting HL UL/HL QL￿ HL AR(1) Std(e)/Std(C)
Empirical values 2.8 0.42 1.51 0.79 4.97
FL and CPS 1.5 0 1.75 0.67 4.94
FL and LRS 1.5 0 1.75 0.67 4.62
FL and UIPS 1.5 0 1.75 0.67 51.5
FL and MPS 1.5 0 1.75 0.67 4.62
SL and CPS 1.75 0 1.75 0.7 4.97
SL and LRS 2.75 0.27 1.75 0.89 4.64
SL and UIPS 1.75 0 1.5 0.69 41.8
SL and MPS 2.75 0.27 1.75 0.89 4.64
Note: HL expresses half-life (measured in years), UL/HL expresses up-life over half-life, QL-HL
expresses quarter-life minus half-life, AR(1) expresses the ￿rst-order autocorrelation of the HP-
￿ltered series, and Std(e)/Std(C) expresses the standard deviation of HP-￿ltered e (real exchange
rate) divided by the standard deviation of HP-￿ltered C (consumption). The point estimates
for AR(1) and Std(e)/Std(C) are calculated by simulating 1,000 data series from each model,
in which each data length is 127, and the point estimate is the median value of the resulting
distribution exactly following Steinsson (2007). FL and SL mean ￿ exible and staggered loan
contracts, respectively. CPS, LRS, UIPS, and MPS denote cost-push shock, loan rate shock, UIP
shock, and monetary policy shock, respectively.
25Table 4: Properties of real exchange rate under infrequent price change model
Setting HL UL/HL QL￿ HL AR(1) Std(e)/Std(C)
Empirical values 2.8 0.42 1.51 0.79 4.97
FL and CPS 2.75 0.18 1.75 0.84 4.96
FL and LRS 2.75 0.18 1.75 0.84 4.64
FL and UIPS 1.25 0 1.75 0.66 99.9
FL and MPS 0.25 0 0.75 0.52 5.02
SL and CPS 2.75 0.25 1.75 0.84 4.97
SL and LRS 3.25 0.31 1.75 0.86 4.64
SL and UIPS 1.25 0 1.75 0.66 91.2
SL and MPS 0.25 0 0.75 0.52 5.02
Note: HL expresses half-life (measured in years), UL/HL expresses up-life over half-life, QL-HL
expresses quarter-life minus half-life, AR(1) expresses the ￿rst-order autocorrelation of the HP-
￿ltered series, and Std(e)/Std(C) expresses the standard deviation of HP-￿ltered e (real exchange
rate) divided by the standard deviation of HP-￿ltered C (consumption). The point estimates
for AR(1) and Std(e)/Std(C) are calculated by simulating 1,000 data series from each model,
in which each data length is 127, and the point estimate is the median value of the resulting
distribution exactly following Steinsson (2007). FL and SL mean ￿ exible and staggered loan
contracts, respectively. CPS, LRS, UIPS, and MPS denote cost-push shock, loan rate shock, UIP
shock, and monetary policy shock, respectively.
26Appendix
A Derivation of the model
The model consists of two symmetric countries.
A.1 Consumer
A.1.1 Cost minimization
The utility of the representative consumer15 in the home country H is increasing and
concave in the aggregate consumption index Ct. The consumption index that consists of









H (1 ￿ ￿H)
1￿￿H
;
where ￿H (0 ￿ ￿H ￿ 1) is a preference parameter that expresses the home bias. Here, CH;t
and CF;t are consumption subindices of the continuum of di⁄erentiated goods produced by




















where ct (f) is the demand for a good produced by ￿rm f in the home country and ct (f￿)
is the demand for a good produced by a ￿rm f￿ in the foreign country, where the asterisk
denotes foreign variables. It is assumed that there are no trade frictions and consumers
in both countries have the same preferences over the di⁄erentiated goods. Following the
standard cost minimization problem on the aggregate consumption index of home and
foreign goods as well as the consumption subindices of the continuum of di⁄erentiated






15The same optimal allocations are obtained even by assuming that each homogenous consumer provides



















where pt (f) is the price on ct (f), and pt (f￿) is the price on ct (f￿). Then, we can obtain





















Here, as in other applications of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)16 aggregator, consumers￿
allocations across di⁄erentiated goods at each time are optimal in terms of cost minimiza-
tion.
We can derive similar optimality conditions for the foreign counterpart. For example,










and the demand functions for each di⁄erentiated good given the aggregate consumption
are:
c￿










































V (lT(￿ h))d￿ h
￿)
;
16Dixit, A., Stiglitz, J., 1977. Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity. American Eco-
nomic Review 67, 297-308.
2where Et is the expectation operator conditional on the state of nature at date t. The
budget constraint of the consumer is given by:17







wt(￿ h)lt(￿ h)d￿ h + ￿B
t + ￿F
t ; (20)
where Bt is a set of risky assets, Dt is the deposit to private banks, it is the nominal
deposit interest rate set by a central bank from t ￿ 1 to t, wt(h) is the nominal wage
for labor supplied from the DFS lt(h), wt(￿ h) is the nominal wage for labor supplied from




t￿1(h)dh is the nominal dividend stemming from the ownership





nominal dividend from the ownership of the ￿rms in the domestic country, and Xt;t+1
is the stochastic discount factor. Here, because we assume a complete ￿nancial market
between the two countries, the consumer in each country can internationally buy and sell
the state contingent securities to insure against country speci￿c shocks. Consequently,
there only exists a unique discount factor. The relationship between the deposit interest
rate and the stochastic discount factor is now expressed as:
1
1 + it
= Et [Xt;t+1]: (21)
Given the optimal allocation of di⁄erentiated consumption expenditures, the consumer
now optimally chooses the total amount of consumption, risky assets, and deposits in each
period. Necessary and su¢ cient conditions, when the transversality condition is satis￿ed,
for those optimizations are given by:















Together with equation (21), we see that the condition given by equation (22) de￿nes the
intertemporally optimal allocation on aggregate consumption. Then, the standard New
17For simplicity, we do not explicitly include the amount of contingency claims under complete ￿nancial
markets.
3Keynesian IS curve for the home country, by log-linearizing equation (22) around steady
states, is obtained as follows:
^ Ct = Et ^ Ct+1 ￿ ￿ (^ {t ￿ Et￿t+1);
where each variable is de￿ned as the log deviation from its steady state where price is
￿ exible and loan rate is constant. We de￿ne ^ {t ￿ ln(1 + it)=(1 + i) where i is a steady-
state value of it, ￿t ￿ ln Pt
Pt￿1 which is an aggregate in￿ ation in the home country, and
￿ ￿ ￿ UC
UCCC > 0.
In this model, a representative consumer provides all types of di⁄erentiated labor to
each ￿rm, and therefore maintains some monopoly power over the determination of his
own wage, as in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000). There are two types of labor group:
the DFS and the IFS. The workers populated on [0;n) belong to the DFS and other labor
populated on [n;1] belong to the IFS.18 We assume that each ￿rm hires all types of labor
in the same proportion from the two groups. The consumer sets each wage wt(h) for any
h and wt(￿ h) for any ￿ h to maximize its utility subject to the budget constraint given by
equation (20) and the labor demand functions given by equations (31) and (32) in the next
section. Here, although di⁄erentiated labor supply is assumed in this paper, consumers

























As written above, thanks to this heterogeneity in labor supply, we can model the di⁄er-
entiated demand for loans without assuming any restrictions on aggregate loans and loan
interest rates. In this paper, consumers supply their labor only for ￿rms, not for banks.
18The di⁄erence of these two groups is characterized by somewhat wider properties of workers, like English
speaking or Japanese speaking, though the di⁄erences of workers within each group are characterized by
narrower properties of workers, like person who has knowledge of accounting in bank or person who has
skill of making automobile in plant.
4Similar to the above case with cost minimization, we can derive the optimality condi-
tions for the foreign counterpart. For example, the standard New Keynesian IS curve for
the foreign country is:
^ C￿
t = Et ^ C￿
t+1 ￿ ￿￿(^ i￿
t ￿ Et￿￿
t+1);
which is derived from the optimality condition on the foreign asset holdings:
U￿
C(C￿






























































Firms in both home and foreign countries optimally hire di⁄erentiated labor as price takers.
This optimal labor allocation is carried out through two-step cost minimization problems.
Domestic ￿rm f hires all types of labor from both the DFS and IFS groups. When hiring
from the DFS group, ￿ portion of the labor cost associated with labor type h is ￿nanced
by borrowing from the local bank h. Then, the ￿rst-step cost minimization problem on the





[1 + ￿rt (h)]wt (h)lt(h;f)dh;














where rt(h) is the loan interest rate applied to employ a particular labor type h applied to
di⁄erentiated labor supply. There lt(h;f) denotes type of labor h employed by ￿rm f. The
5local bank h has some monopoly power over setting loan interest rates. Thus, we assume
the monopolistic competition on the loan contracts between banks and ￿rms. The relative






















As a result, we can derive
Z n
0
[1 + ￿rt (h)]wt (h)lt (h;f)dh = ￿tLt (f):
Through a similar cost minimization problem, we can derive the relative demand for



















































dh = ￿ ￿t￿ Lt (f):
According to the above two optimality conditions, the ￿rms optimally choose the alloca-
tion of di⁄erentiated workers between the two groups. Because ￿rms have some preference
n to hire workers from the DFS and (1 ￿ n) to hire workers from the IFS, the second-step
cost minimization problem describing the allocation of di⁄erentiated labor between these
two groups is given by
min
Lt;Lt
￿tLt (f) + ￿ ￿t￿ Lt (f);
subject to the aggregate labor index:
~ Lt (f) ￿
[Lt (f)]
n ￿￿ Lt (f)
￿1￿n
nn (1 ￿ n)
1￿n :
Then, the relative demand functions for each di⁄erentiated type of labor are derived as
follows:












~ ￿t ￿ ￿n
t ￿ ￿1￿n
t :
Therefore, we can obtain the following equations:
￿tLt (f) + ￿ ￿t￿ Lt (f) = ~ ￿t~ Lt (f);
lt (h;f) =
￿




















)￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿t
~ ￿t
￿￿1
~ Lt (f); (32)
from equations (27), (28), (29), and (30). We can now clearly see that the demand for each
di⁄erentiated worker depends on wages and loan interest rates, given the total demand for
labor.
Finally, by the assumption that the ￿rms ￿nance part of the labor costs by loans, we
can derive
qt (h;f) = ￿wt (h)lt (h;f)
= ￿wt (h)
￿

































qt (h;f) and qt
￿￿ h;f
￿
denote amounts of loan borrowed by ￿rm f to the labor types h and
￿ h, respectively. These conditions demonstrate that the demands for each di⁄erentiated
loan also depend on the wages and loan interest rates, given the total labor demand.

















































































































Furthermore, loan demand conditions are
q￿
t (h￿;f￿) = ￿￿w￿
t (h￿)l￿























































8A.2.2 Price setting (pro￿t maximization)
As is standard in the New Keynesian model following the Calvo (1983) - Yun (1996)
framework, each ￿rm f resets its price with probability (1 ￿ ￿) and maximizes the present






pt (f)ct;T (f) + STp￿
t (f)c￿
t;T (f) ￿ ~ ￿T ~ LT (f)
i
; (33)
where we use equations (17) and (19) for any time t. Here, the ￿rm sets pt (f) and p￿
t (f)
separately under the pricing-to-market assumption. There St is the nominal exchange rate.





































It should be noted that price setting is independent of the loan interest rate setting of
private banks.
The optimal price setting of ￿ pt (f) under the situation in which managers can reset
















where we substitute equation (23). By further substituting equations (24) and (25) into
















































































By log-linearizing equation (35), we derive
1
1 ￿ ￿￿






￿1 ^ RH;T + ￿2 ^ R￿






9where ￿1 ￿ n
￿(1+RH)




H are positive parameters, and we de￿ne
the real marginal cost as
c mcH;t;T (f) ￿
Z n
0



























































where RH;t is the aggregate loan interest rate by local banks in the home country, R￿
H;t is
the aggregate loan interest rate by international banks in the home country, and ￿H;t is























where we make use of the relationship:
c mcH;t;T (f) = c mcH;T ￿ ￿2￿
"










Y (YH) . We de￿ne ^ RH;t ￿ ln(1 + RH;t)=(1 + RH). We further denote the




































The point is that unit marginal cost is the same for all ￿rms in the situation where each
￿rm uses all types of labor and loans with the same proportion. Thus, all ￿rms set the
same price if they have a chance to reset their prices at time t.
In the Calvo (1983) - Yun (1996) setting, the evolution of the aggregate price index P































The current aggregate price is given by the weighted average of changed and unchanged
prices. Because the chances of resetting prices are randomly assigned to each ￿rm with
equal probability, an aggregate price change at time t should be evaluated by an average
of price changes by all ￿rms. By log-linearizing equation (38), together with equation (37),
we can derive the following New Keynesian Phillips curve:
￿H;t = ￿
￿




where the slope coe¢ cient ￿ ￿
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿(1+￿2￿) is a positive parameter. This is quite similar
to the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, but contains loan interest rates as cost
components.
Similarly, regarding the optimal price setting of ￿ p￿






H;t + ￿1 b RH;t + ￿2 b R￿






H;t is given by replacing P by P￿ in c mcH;t. ￿￿
H;t is in￿ ation of goods produced in
the home country and consumed in the foreign country.
Furthermore, from optimal price settings by ￿rm f￿ in the foreign country, the New















c mcF;t + ￿￿
1 ^ R￿
F;t + ￿￿












2 ￿ (1 ￿ n)
￿ ￿￿(1+RF)






RF;t is the aggregate loan interest rate by international banks in the foreign country, R￿
F;t
is the aggregate loan interest rate by local banks in the foreign country, ￿￿
F;t is in￿ ation
of goods produced and consumed in the foreign country, and ￿F;t is in￿ ation of goods
produced in the foreign country and consumed in the home country.
As for CPI in￿ ation rates, from equations (16) and (18), we can derive the following
log-linearized relations as




H;t + (1 ￿ ￿F)￿￿
F;t;
under the assumption of ￿H = 1￿￿F; namely, symmetric home bias. Then, by considering
the weighted average of equations (39) and (42) and the weighted average of equations
(40) and (41), respectively, we can ￿nally obtain the following two New Keynesian Phillips
curves for consumer prices:
￿t = ￿H￿
￿
￿1 ^ RH;t + ￿2 ^ R￿
H;t
￿











t + (1 ￿ ￿H) ^ CW￿
t
i
+ &^ et + ￿Et￿t+1 + mt;
￿￿
t = (1 ￿ ￿H)￿
￿


















t^ et + ￿Et￿￿
t+1 + m￿
t;
12where ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿1￿￿1
1 + ￿2 + ￿￿1￿









> 0, & ￿ 2￿￿H (1 ￿ ￿H),
and &￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿F (1 ￿ ￿F), where ￿1 ￿
fL(e L)e L

















t = ￿F ^ Ct + (1 ￿ ￿F) ^ C￿
t :
mt and m￿
t are cost-push shocks in home and foreign countries from productivity shocks,
respectively. Here, we assume a linear production function as yt (f) = At~ Lt (f), where
At is a common productivity shock among domestic ￿rms. We have similar production
functions for ￿rms in the foreign country. As shown in Appendix of Steinsson (2007), mt
and m￿
t are given by weighted average according to home bias of the home and foreign
productivity shocks. In the simulation, we assume productivity shocks in two countries,
satisfying mt > 0 and m￿
t = 0 as in Steinsson (2007).






When goods price is ￿ exible, equations (43) and (44) are reduced to
0 = ￿H
￿
￿1 ^ RH;t + ￿2 ^ R￿
H;t
￿










t + (1 ￿ ￿H) ^ CW￿
t
i
+ 2￿H (1 ￿ ￿H) ^ et + mt;
0 = (1 ￿ ￿H)
￿














t + (1 ￿ ￿F) ^ CW￿
t
i
￿ 2￿F (1 ￿ ￿F) ^ et + m￿
t;
since ￿rms change goods prices in each period to maximize a following period pro￿t with

































where we ￿nally have b ~ pt (f) = 0.
13When deriving equations (43) and (44), we assume that marginal cost elasticities of
productions are zero, namely that the production function is linear, and ￿ = ￿￿ and
￿ = ￿￿, as is demonstrated in Table 2.19 Furthermore, in this transformation, we use the
optimality conditions on bond holdings:
^ Ct ￿ ^ C￿
t = ￿^ et: (45)
Equation (45) is obtained from two Euler equations in the domestic and foreign countries,
namely, equations (23) and (26), under the internationally complete ￿nancial market.20
We also use the log deviation of the real exchange rate from its steady state value as
￿￿
t ￿ ￿t + 4^ St = 4^ et:
A.3 Private banks
A local bank lends only to ￿rms when they hire labor from the DFS. However, an interna-
tional bank only provides a loan to ￿rms when they hire labor from the IFS.
First, we describe the optimization problem of an international bank in the home coun-
try. Here, the international bank takes on the exchange rate risk inherent in its loans.
Each international bank can reset loan interest rates with probability (1 ￿ ￿ ’￿) following
the Calvo (1983) - Yun (1996) framework. Under the segmented environment stemming
from di⁄erences in labor supply, private banks can set di⁄erent loan interest rates depend-
ing on the types of labor. As a consequence, the private bank holds some monopoly power
over the loan interest rate to ￿rms. Therefore, the international bank ￿ h￿ chooses the loan
interest rate rt
￿￿ h￿￿











￿ ST (1 + iT)
￿
:































19￿2 = 0, ￿1 = 0, ￿
￿
2 = 0, and ￿
￿
1 = 0. If the marginal cost elasticity of production is nonzero, the Phillips
curves become more complicated. However, the qualitative outcomes of simulations do not change even
under a positive marginal cost elasticity of production.
20Following the convention, we assume e0 = 1.
14Because the international private banks that have the opportunity to reset their loan in-
terest rates will set the same loan interest rate, the solution of rt
￿￿ h￿￿
in equation (46) is
expressed only with ￿ rt. In this case, we have the following evolution of the aggregate loan
interest rate index by international banks in the home country:
1 + RF;t = ￿ ’￿ (1 + RF;t￿1) + (1 ￿ ￿ ’￿)(1 + ￿ rt): (47)
By log-linearizing equations (46) and (47), we can determine the relationship between the
loan and deposit interest rate as follows:
^ RF;t = ￿ ￿
￿
1Et ^ RF;t+1 + ￿ ￿
￿























1+RF are positive para-
meters. This equation describes the foreign country￿ s loan interest rate (supply) curve by
the international bank in the home country.





T￿t Xt;Tqt;T (h;f)frt (h) ￿ MTiTg:
Mt is an exogenous disturbance for net interest rate in collecting deposits, where Mt is one
in the steady state. Cœrdia and Woodford (2009) and Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti
(2009) emphasize importance of loan rates shock from a default risk and a risk premium
for borrower. Through the optimization problem of a local bank h in the home country,
we can obtain the relationship between loan and deposit interest rates as follows:











1+RH are positive parameters.
zt is loan rates shock for the loan rate set by the home local bank to a home ￿rm, which
comes from Mt. This equation describes the home country￿ s loan interest rate (supply)
curve by the local bank in the home country.

























d￿ h￿ = (1 ￿ n)DT:
For international banks in the foreign country, we can derive the following loan interest
rate curve:
^ R￿
H;t = ￿ ￿1Et ^ R￿
H;t+1 + ￿ ￿2 ^ R￿
H;t￿1 + ￿ ￿3
￿




where ￿ ￿1 ￿
￿ ’￿
1+(￿ ’)2￿, ￿ ￿2 ￿
￿ ’







H are positive parame-
ters. This equation describes the home country￿ s loan interest rate (supply) curve by the

























parameters. This equation describes the foreign country￿ s loan interest rate (supply) curve
by the local bank in the foreign country. It should be noted that the four types of private
bank in both the home and foreign countries can have di⁄erent probabilities for resetting































d￿ h = (1 ￿ n)D￿
T:
B Impulse response
We show the impulse response to a loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local
bank to a home ￿rm. Figure A1 shows the case for the model with a ￿ exible loan rate
16and ￿ exible goods price settings, and corresponds to the third row of Table 3. Figure A2
shows the case for the model with a sticky loan rate and ￿ exible goods price settings, and
corresponds to the seventh row of Table 3. Figure A3 shows the case for the model with
a ￿ exible loan rate and sticky goods price settings, and corresponds to the third row of
Table 4. Figure A4 shows the case for a model with a sticky loan rate and sticky goods
price settings, and corresponds to the seventh row of Table 4.
[Figure A1: Impulse response to a loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local
bank for a home ￿rm in the model with a ￿ exible loan rate and ￿ exible goods price
settings]
[Figure A2: Impulse response to a loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local
bank for a home ￿rm in the model with a sticky loan rate and ￿ exible goods price settings]
[Figure A3: Impulse response to a loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local
bank for a home ￿rm in the model with a ￿ exible loan rate and sticky goods price settings]
[Figure A4: Impulse response to a loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local
bank for a home ￿rm in the model with a sticky loan rate and sticky goods price settings]
17Figure 1: Outline of the model 
 
   Figure A1: Impulse response to a loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local bank for a 
home firm in the model with a flexible loan rate and flexible goods price settings 
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loan rate from foreign local bank to foreign firm
loan rate from foreign international bank to home firm
home policy rate
foreign policy rate
Percentage deviationFigure A2: Impulse response to a loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local bank for a 
home firm in the model with a sticky loan rate and flexible goods price settings 
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Percentage deviationFigure A3: Impulse response to a loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local bank for a 
home firm in the model with a flexible loan rate and sticky goods price settings 
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Percentage deviationFigure A4: Impulse response to a loan rate shock for the loan rate set by the home local bank for a 
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